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D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Tactical Interface Study Committee
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Definition of National and Tactical Intelligence

1. I hear a good bit of what I believe is inaccurate utilization of the terms "national" and "tactical" intelligence. Inaccuracies develop from the fact of the very complex and difficult subject with which you are wrestling. I would like to share with you my views on how we define the national and tactical intelligence, because unless there is full agreement on this, your study can only end in controversy.

2. I believe that there are four bases on which you could divide intelligence into national and tactical categories:

- a. By the quality or nature of the intelligence itself;
- b. By who produces the intelligence;
- c. By who utilizes the intelligence;
- d. By who collects the intelligence.

*See 1 Dec 77 Chrono
for DCI signed version*

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3. Subdivision by nature and quality: I find it difficult to find any examples of intelligence which are uniquely national or uniquely tactical in all circumstances. For instance, the most detailed tactical intelligence might be a lookout with binoculars sighting four tanks coming across the East German/West German border. Clearly, this is primarily a matter of concern to the tactical commander. Yet, there are many circumstances in which it would be brought immediately to the attention of the President of the United States, e.g., it was the initiation of hostilities, e.g., it was the appearance of an armored division in an area where we had never noted or expected one before and during a war. Similarly, during the Mayaguez crisis, the President was intimately involved in details of the movement of boats with personnel in them, normally, a very tactical matter. At the other end of the spectrum, I can hardly think of a piece of intelligence primarily intended for use at the national level which is not of some concern to major tactical commanders. In short, what is national and what is tactical by its nature varies with the circumstances and with the level of command. Most frequently, one man's tactics is another man's strategy.

4. Subdivision by producer: If the previous paragraph is correct, it's almost axiomatic that no matter who produces the intelligence it is going to be difficult to label it either national or tactical. In addition, the way we are organized for producing intelligence there certainly is no clear line between who does what on this particular grounds.

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5. Subdivision by consumer: Again, no matter who the intended consumer is, there may well be other consumers who are equally involved in the question and it would be impossible to subdivide on this grounds.

6. Subdivision by collector of intelligence: There is available to us a clear line of demarcation here, e.g., is the collecting unit funded in the National Foreign Intelligence budget or is it not?

7. I therefore believe that what we mean by national intelligence is that which is collected by units funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program; what we mean by tactical intelligence is that which is collected by elements that are funded in the Defense Department's budget.

8. It therefore seems to me that what we are talking about in your study is how we task national and tactical collection units to best satisfy the total needs of both; and, how to disseminate the intelligence received by both national and tactical collectors so as to insure the best utilization of it.

STANSFIELD TURNER

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The Director

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

11 November 1977

Dr. William J. McGill, President
Columbia University in the City
of New York
New York, New York 10027

Dear Dr. McGill:

I certainly appreciate the description in your letter of 12 October of the difficult position in which you have been placed by our disclosures on MKULTRA. I only wish that this bit of history had not been forced back to the surface again since we really uncovered very little that was new in substance. Still, as you would appreciate, I had no option once the materials were discovered than to present them to Congress which had previously been told that such materials had been destroyed.

I would like to assure you that as of this time we have located no additional evidence of the involvement of Columbia University, or anyone affiliated with Columbia, in drug testing or human behavioral research of the type associated with Project MKULTRA. Except to the extent that certain information was deleted from the documents which have been supplied to you, I can assure you there is no basis for concern on your part that we have made only a "partial disclosure" of our involvement with Columbia. We have honestly attempted to be as forthcoming as possible within the legal constraints which made those deletions necessary. I do believe that our actions have been faithful to the spirit of sharing with you everything that we possibly can.

STAT I would like also to add, contrary somewhat to the statement in your letter [redacted] that Mr. Lapham's 12 August letter to you was written at my direction and initiative rather than at the insistence of the counsel of a congressional committee. I had discussed the question in the public hearing with some members of the Senate, but I made my decision to notify the universities involved with MKULTRA after consulting several of your eminent colleagues whose universities were not so involved. I simply asked them whether if they had been involved they would have preferred to hear from me directly with the attendant additional risk of leakage of this information, or whether they would prefer to have not been informed at all. The response that I received was unanimously and imperatively in favor of hearing all the news that we could transmit.

Hence, I asked my General Counsel to communicate with you and the presidents of the other universities involved. I sincerely hoped that this action would have resulted in a less painful experience for Columbia than if we had not so informed you.

With regard to your concern that there may be more research grants to Columbia funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, I can only say that if that is the case it is entirely possible that the materials available to us at this time do not accurately or completely record the full extent of the MKULTRA program. Unfortunately, as you know, the project records themselves were destroyed in 1973. Our knowledge of MKULTRA is now limited to what may be deduced from the surviving financial records which were uncovered last August and which are fragmentary at best. To the extent you have been able to supplement those records with recollections and records of the individual involved at Columbia, a source not available to us, your knowledge of the events may well in fact exceed ours. There is no evidence in our records of other research grants made to Columbia without the knowledge of the University. However, since retrieval of information regarding activities long past is sometimes difficult, I would be grateful if you would identify suspected incidents which continue to trouble you in order that we might investigate them.


Let me only assure you that the Agency has long since terminated support of drug-testing research of the type that was funded under the MKULTRA umbrella. Such research is no longer regarded as a proper activity for the Agency to undertake. Moreover, any research involving experimentation on individuals is coordinated with and cleared through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare at this time. With respect to any Central Intelligence Agency activity on an academic campus, our present policy requires that the appropriate senior management officials of the academic institution be made aware of all Agency contracts or Agency-sponsored research projects that are performed at academic institutions.

I apologize for the confusion over the additional project file which we sent to you and which it appears did not contain any information indicating that the research in question was connected with Columbia University.

Passing to another matter for the moment, while it remains our intention to protect individual and institutional identities to the fullest extent possible, the Agency has come under increasing pressure through congressional inquiries and Freedom of Information Act requests to release the names of institutions notified of involvement in these activities. Where a university has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts. Your letter indicated that you have advised the University Senate of this matter and that it was your desire to furnish a full accounting to the faculty and student body. In order for us to be able to assess our position properly in this regard, it would be most helpful if you would confirm whether you have publicly disclosed our previous correspondence or the matters to which it related and, if not, whether you believe the identity of your University should continue to be protected against disclosure by this Agency.

Again, may I express my appreciation for the helpful tone of your letter. I am sorry that we had to bring you into sharing this unpleasant experience with us in any way. If there is anything more I can do to be helpful to you in explaining this situation to your constituencies, I would be most pleased to do so.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Stansfield Turner". The signature is fluid and stylized, with a large initial "S".

STANSFIELD TURNER

10 NOV 1977

TAPE 33
SIDE A
0 - 1/8

DRAFT FORM LETTER

Dear _____,

Last week Bill Wells sent you a notification that we were forced to ask you to terminate your employment with the Agency. He did this with my full approval. I want you to know, however, that this was not a decision taken lightly or easily. With an agency that has as many dedicated and highly competent people as this one, it is not easy to pare down in size. One cannot take lightly the danger of cutting into capabilities that are essential for our country. One also cannot take lightly the danger of selecting the wrong individuals to ask to leave.

I do want you to know that I believe most sincerely that this reduction will strengthen, not weaken, the Agency and, in particular, the Directorate of Operations. We cannot maintain our pride, morale and efficiency if we are overstaffed. While it is never easy to reduce an organization, there are times when it simply must be done in the national interest.

I also want you to know that we made every effort to be as fair as possible in selecting the individuals concerned. We followed the guidelines laid down in DDO's _____ as closely as possible with due regard to the many human factors involved. There is simply no way to assure that we have not made mistakes. I can only tell you

that we have genuinely attempted to balance what appears to be best and necessary for the Agency and fair and appropriate for the individuals.

Please know that we are all very grateful for your _____ years of service to our Agency and our country. You have every reason to be more than proud of the record that you have made. I wish you well as you move along. We will, if it interests you, make every effort to see if there is a position for you in another Directorate, (this phrase not to go in the supergrade notices) and to help you in any way we can with locating other employment.